Industry 4.0 related innovation and firm growth by Behrens, Vanessa & Trunschke, Markus
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  V A N E S S A  B E H R E N S  A N D  M A R K U S  T R U N S C H K E
/ /  N O . 2 0 - 0 7 0  |  1 1 / 2 0 2 0
Industry 4.0 Related  
Innovation and Firm Growth
Industry 4.0 Related Innovation and
Firm Growth
Vanessa Behrens∗ , Markus Trunschke†
September 2020
In this paper we explore the relationship between innovative firms that patent tech-
nology related to Industry 4.0 and their economic performance. By applying the new
patent cartography developed by the EPO that identifies firm’s 4.0 patents, this is
one of the first large-scale, systematic studies on the impact of 4.0 technologies. Since
4.0 patents are more likely to be general purpose technologies, firms with 4.0 patents
should be in a better position to increase their sales as 4.0 technology has on average
a wider industrial applicability. Results of our Fixed Effects Least Squares regressions
and Dynamic Panel Model suggest that 4.0 patent stock is positively associated to
sales and that this effect is significantly larger than the effect of Non-4.0 patent stock.
These effects are found to be decreasing with firm size.
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1 Introduction
On-going advancements in artificial intelligence, digitalization, connectivity, smart ma-
chines and the internet of things (IoT) are expected to bring forth a digital transforma-
tion that will mark a new era of technological development; the 4th Industrial Revolution
(also known as Industry 4.0). It is expected to completely revolutionise production and
operation procedures, boosting productivity and growth not just at the firm-level, but for
the economy as a whole.
The benefits of the Industry 4.0 are expected to range from predicting and preventing
major epidemics, to minimising waste, better forecasting of the supply chain and being able
to deliver customised products on demand.1 At the same time, concerns are being raised
about job replacement, data security and the ethics of privacy (Arntz et al., 2017; Agrawal
et al., 2018). The opportunities and threats of the digital transformation have made In-
dustry 4.0 a topic high on the agenda of businesses and policy-makers alike (OECD, 2018).
Yet the influence that Industry 4.0 will have is not well understood. Little economic
research on the topic exists and we often have to rely on the evidence at hand from the
literature on IT. When looking at its impact on firm performance, this strand of literature
tends to focus on very specific contexts of a 4.0 related technology that is adopted or
implemented at one production plant. This makes them neither representative of all 4.0
technologies, nor does it facilitate extrapolation of their results. The most challenging
obstacle for economists has been the lack of consensus as to what should be considered as
4.0-related and how to measure it.
This dissertation chapter is the first large-scale, systematic analysis on the impact of in-
venting 4.0 technology on firm performance. Using the newly developed (all-encompassing)
4.0 patent cartography of the EPO we are able to investigate all German firms that are
patenting in 4.0 technology.2 A comparison to other innovative German firms that are
1See Appendix A of the discussion paper by (McKinsey, 2017) for an elaborate description of five case
studies on the application and benefits of artificial intelligence. The paper also reports the results of
what is the most extensive firm survey that exists on AI.
2Henceforth, we will use the acronym ’4.0’ to either refer to Industry 4.0 or ’4.0 technology’ and ’4.0
patents’ to refer to technology and patents that are 4.0 related. It should also be noted that the EPO
refers to the 4th Industrial Revolution, but Industry 4.0 is becoming a more widely accepted term, now
also in the English language.
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patenting but not in 4.0, allows us to quantify the additionality effect of 4.0 inventions. In-
novative firms have a competitive advantage that enables them to survive and grow (Doms
et al., 1995; Aghion et al., 2001) and patenting these inventions per definition offers them
monopoly power via the right to exclude.
Diverging from the common approach in the literature, we study the impact of 4.0
technology on sales turnover, rather than productivity as the performance measure. Our
main motivation for this is that the firms in our sample are developers of 4.0 technology
rather than adopters, which means that they may not have large scale production plants
to realise productivity gains. The sale of products or software solutions encompassing
their 4.0 technology however, is a channel through which we can capture the economic
gains that 4.0 developers might experience. This applies equally to licensing royalties. In
fact, a firm’s capability to produce general purpose technologies (GPTs) is an important
determinant of licensing (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2013).3 Strong arguments have
been put forth that 4.0 technologies are general purpose technologies (GPTs), which is
characterised by pervasive use in a wide range of sectors and has far reaching industrial
applicability (Agrawal et al., 2018; Cockburn et al., 2018; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,
1995). We therefore expect it to be easier for firms to generate sales turnover from 4.0
patents than from Non-4.0 patents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first describe the channels through
which 4.0 patenting is expected to lead to higher sales turnover in section 2, give a short
overview of the existing literature on the the relationship between ICT and patents on
firm performance in the section 3. section 4 focuses on the data we use for our analysis,
followed by the description of the econometric methodology in section 5 and the estimation
results in section 6, before we draw our conclusions in section 7.
2 Channels of 4.0 Patenting to Higher Sales
The concept of Industry 4.0 is the application of modern information and communication
technologies (ICT) in production facilities. 4.0 inventions are very closely related to ICT,
3Small firms license out 26% of their patents and leave 18% unused, while large firms license out only
10% and leave 40% of their patents unused Giuri et al. (2007).
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with the addition of connectivity. It is a relatively recent term often used in the context
of the productivity paradox, since ICT lead to a wave of productivity increases (Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Bloom et al., 2012; Hubbard, 2003; Bartel et al., 2007), which is
not yet observed for the 4th Industrial Revolution (i.e. Industry 4.0). Sensors and the
use of internet connection allow machines to communicate and exchange data with each
other and with humans. These smart machines and smart production plants (also knows
as cyber physical systems or more generally IoT; the internet of things), enable greater
flexibility in production processes to react and adjust according to capacity constraints
or specific demands of customers. A study that nicely shows how ICT-enhanced equip-
ment allows for greater flexibility is one by Bartel et al. (2007). In the context of valve
manufacturing, production plants that adopt new ICT-enhanced equipment are capable
of producing more customised products. The introduction of the technology Bartel et al.
look at - computer numeric controlled machines (CNC) - is in fact an early example of 4.0
technology, even though the authors do not define it as such. CNCs allow for more flexible
production, improved quality control and reduced set up times.4 Logic follows that these
kind of efficiency gains can be expected for adopters of 4.0 technology.
The firms in our sample are not strictly speaking 4.0 adopters however. Our sample
consists of the firms that file patent applications to protect the 4.0 technologies invented
by them. In other words, our sample consists of 4.0 developers who do not necessarily
implement the 4.0 technology in their own production facilities. Being an adopter is not
mutually exclusive from being a 4.0 developer. Besides equipping machines with sensors
and other components that allow transmission of data, these 4.0 developers write soft-
ware solutions to assist production and the logistical system of their customers. They
may not necessarily experience efficiency gains in their own production process, but may
achieve higher sales either through licensing royalties, or by selling products encompass-
ing 4.0 technologies, for which they will be able to attract a more diverse customer base,
since 4.0 technologies - as general purpose technologies - can be applied to a broader
range of industries. Since we cannot be sure that the 4.0 inventing firms of our sample
are adopers, but we can be sure that they are developers, we decided to diverge from the
4An example of a CNC is the 5 axis multi-purpose milling, drilling, and boring machine T-30 manufactured
by Cincinnati Milacron. The technology to this machine was patented in 1992 by General Electric Co
(EP0545658A2) at the EPO. It’s CPC class G05B 19 (now G05B 15) was classified by EPO’s new
patent cartography as being a 4.0 relevant technology.
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traditional approach that looks at ICT on productivity, and instead look at sales turnover.
A study conducted on German firms by Saam et al. (2016) found that the motives
for firms to adopt 4.0 technology was predominantly to increase efficiency or to achieve
greater customisation, while 4.0 developers predominantly focus on product innovation
that are software compatible. These software compatible products can in turn increase
sales turnover as a result of higher demand for more flexible solutions. What is suggestive
of this being a promising avenue is that after the introduction of software patents in the US
firms in all ICT sectors invested in these patents (Hall and MacGarvie, 2010). In Europe,
software patents are also experiencing steady growth.5 In the last three years, the rate of
growth for 4.0 patent applications was 54%. This far outpaces the overall growth of patent
applications in the last three years of 7.65% (EPO, 2017). If we want our patent system
to remain an effective institution that encourages innovation in a digital era, then we have
to better understand the underlying mechanisms of software patents versus non-software
patents, or 4.0 patents versus Non-4.0 patents.
There are some noteworthy underlying differences between 4.0 (or software) patents and
more traditional patents. Software patents often protect parts of a process, for which it
is harder to detect infringement.6 Based on a small sample of software start-ups, Mann
(2005) finds that it is relatively easy to invent around software patents, which might be
why not many software firms acquire patents (Mann and Sager, 2007). Still, the firms in
our sample do file software patents. The benefits are likely to lie in one of the following
two reasons. One, is that the firm is indeed a 4.0 developer and adopter simultaneously
and therefore seeks to commercialise it by selling products encompassing the 4.0 technol-
ogy. The second reason is that the firm primarily wants to sell or license the intellectual
property. Otherwise, secrecy would be a viable option.
5It is a common misconception that software cannot be patented in Europe. To make sure that software
patents can be filed at the EPO, we got in contact with the examiner at the EPO who developed the
4.0 cartography. He told us that all 4.0 patents are software patents, practically by default because
connectivity and data exchange is a prerequisite. They are however not termed as software patents,
but instead are referred to as computer implemented inventions because they have to operate a device
(though not necessarily a product).
6Increasing litigation of software patents has sparked a debate on the quality and uncertainty of software
patents (Lerner, 2010). Given the willingness of the patent holder to initiate litigation procedures, the
patents should be strong, enforceable patents. Yet Allison et al. (2011) finds that conditional on going
to trial, software patents only win 13% of the cases.
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3 Literature
In essence, this study is positioned in the strand of literature that attempts to quantify the
private value of patents as well as the more recent literature on software patents, which is
yet again closely related to prior literature on the returns to information technology (IT).
The existing literature on the private returns of patents (to the firm) can be categorized
into studies that look at three outcome variables; market value (sometimes measures as
Tobin’s Q), sales turnover and productivity. Towards the end of this section we will make a
stronger link between the more recent literature on software patents and our 4.0 patenting
firms, which is yet again closely related to prior literature on the returns to information
technology (IT).
The first systematic assessment of the monetary private economic value of patents is
that of Gambardella et al. (2008). They make use of a unique large-scale dataset (PatVal-
EU) designed to represent the universe of European Patents in six EU countries. This
European survey asked individual (EP) patent holders about the minimum price for which
they would sell their patent. The mean value is estimated to be larger than 3 million euro.
The median however, lies at around one-tenth of that, supporting prior findings on the
skewness of the patent value distribution. Scherer (1998) and Silverberg and Verspagen
(2007), find a similar skewed value distribution by looking at patent licensing royalties,
patent profits (according to survey evidence), and a number of other measures of returns
to innovation.7 Hall et al. (2013) investigated whether patents have a positive effect on
innovation-related turnover, conditional on the firm stating that it had introduced a prod-
uct and/or process innovation. Using Community Innovation Survey data for the United
Kingdom, their results suggest that patented innovations are more successful at generating
sales.
Bloom et al. (2002) look at the impact of patents on two measures of company perfor-
mance; productivity and market value. They find that citation weighted patent stock has
an economically and statistically significant impact on firm-level productivity and market
value. A doubling of the citation-weighted patent stock increases total factor productivity
7Successfully licensing a patent is facilitated if the patent has received many citations (Sampat and
Ziedonis, 2005). However, citations were not good at predicting the amount of licensing revenue earned.
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by 3%. While it takes time to have an affect on productivity, the effect is immediate upon
market values. Patent citations are found to be more informative than the simple patent
counts that have been used previously in the literature. This is in agreement with the
pioneering study by Trajtenberg (1990), who was really the first to identify the importance
of patent citations as a value measure. He exclusively examines one particular innovation
- computed tomograbeen takephy scanners - and finds that patent citations are related to
private value as well as social value. A few years later, Trajtenberg coauthored a paper,
see Hall et al. (2005), that uses three variations of an explanatory variable of interest -
citations to patents, patents to R&D and R&D to assets stocks - and find that each of
these ratios significantly increases the firms’ market value (measured as Tobin’s Q). More
concretely, one extra citation per patent is estimated to increases market value by 3% .
To a considerable extent, the literature on ICT is relevant for us due to the similarity
of the arguments of how ICT impacts the firm and the impacts we expect 4.0 technology
to have. Similar to the adoption of new IT, 4.0 technology can improve firm performance
through the channels of higher flexibility (in the production process) and improved product
quality or customization. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) for example estimate a produc-
tion function for large US firms over the period 1987 to 1991 including IT-capital as an
input. They then test whether the contribution of IT-capital to output (sales) is positive
and significantly different from zero using the output elasticity of IT-capital. The results
show, that the output elasticity is indeed significantly positive.
The main way in which our approach diverges from the literature on IT is that we
are not exclusively looking at adopters of 4.0 technology. We are looking at the devel-
opers of 4.0, who may or may not adopt these technologies at their own production plants.
A lack of evidence on the effects of patents/innovations on firm sales ceases to exist.
This may be because the average firm only experiences very modest growth in sales. This
point was made by Coad and Rao (2008) who therefore argue that it is not so interesting to
look at regression techniques that focus on the average effects of the average firm. Rather,
they perform quantile regressions focusing on incumbent US firms (from Compustat) in
four commonly studied high-tech sectors. Indeed they find that the effects of innovation
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on growth are modest, on average, but that for the fast-growth firms at the upper quan-
tiles, the coefficient on innovation rises sharply. In the lowest quantile, the effect is even
negative but only significant for one of the four sectors.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use information from two different datasets for our analysis. The first, the Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (MUP) is a dataset maintained by ZEW since 1992 in cooperation with
Creditreform. It is the most extensive firm-level panel dataset for Germany (outside of
official government statistics). Representing almost the entire German firm population, it
contains information on the number of employees, sales, address, five-digit industry sector
code (NACE rev. 2), date of foundation, date of closure, data of insolvency procedures,
and shareholder structure. The second dataset we make use of is the worldwide patent
statistical database (PATSTAT). This dataset contains rich information on all patents filed
worldwide. We merge detailed information on the patent portfolios (from PATSTAT) to
the firms in our MUP data. Using the patent cartography that the EPO produced, we
classify these patents into 4.0 related or not. We restrict the patents considered in this
study to patents filed at the European Patent Office because the 4.0 patent cartography
is only available for these patents.
Patent stocks were calculated using the perpetual inventory method as in the following
equation Kt = It + (1 − δ)Kt−1, where Kt stands for the patent stock, It is the number
of patent applications in year t and δ notes the depreciation rate, which we chose to be
15%, as established in the literature (Hall et al.).
Using all years available in the panel (1993-2017), our sample consists of 1,453 firms that
hold at least one 4.0 patent and 17,759 firms that do not (see Figure 3 in the appendix).
This is much lower than the total population of German firms because we only consider
patenting firms, in order to rule out self selection into patenting. We also drop firms that
are only observed once, as these cannot contribute to the estimation using panel data
methods. We have a total number of 193,199 observations, meaning that we observe each
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firm for 10 years on average. The panel is unbalanced however, for years in which data
on sales and employees was not available. We removed outliers by dropping the top one
percentile of Log(Sales) and TotalPatStock (which is the sum of 4.0 and Non-4.0 patent
stock) to ensure that our results are not driven by single outlier observations.
Table 1: Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics.
(1) (2) (3)
Non-4.0 4.0 Mean Differences
mean sd mean sd p
Firm Age 32.2234 (34.04) 23.0100 (26.54) 0.000
Sales (Mil.) 21.3818 (74.58) 34.1262 (108.00) 0.000
Log(Sales) 15.3889 (1.82) 15.6925 (1.96) 0.000
Employees 82.7679 (636.16) 117.1966 (345.96) 0.000
Total PatStock 0.9997 (2.36) 2.6200 (5.76) 0.000
4.0 PatStock 0.0000 (0.00) 0.5303 (1.00) 0.000
Non-4.0 PatStock 0.9997 (2.36) 2.0897 (5.48) 0.000
Sqr(4.0 PatStock) 0.0000 (0.00) 1.2799 (13.05) 0.000
Sqr(Non-4.0 PatStock) 6.5471 (62.22) 34.4262 (187.73) 0.000
Observations 176918 16281 193199
Table 1 presents firm-level summary statistics of the mean, standard deviation and the
p-value on the test of differences in the means of 4.0 and Non-4.0 patenting firms. Ger-
man firms that file patents related to 4.0 are on average younger than Non-4.0 patenting
firms; 23 years of age compared to 32, respectively. 4.0 firms have a sales turnover of 34
million Euros on average, compared to 21 million Euros for Non-4.0 firms. The density
distribution of the log-transformation of sales is depicted in Figure 1.8 Comparing the
sales distributions of Non-4.0 firms to 4.0 firms before they filed a 4.0 patent (”Pre-4.0”)
indicates that the values of Log(Sales) were somewhat more volatile for 4.0 firms, as seen
by the flatter and wider distribution. After filing a 4.0 patent (”Post-4.0”) firms appear
to experience higher sales, as observed by the clear shift to the right of the distribution.
Despite 4.0 firms being younger, they are significantly larger with 117 employees on
average, compared to 83 employees for Non-4.0 firms. Our main variables of interest
measures 4.0 and Non-4.0 patent stock of each firm each year. The logic for using stock
8Note that for the figure, sales values were deflated to account for inflation. Deflator values were obtained
from The World Bank. Deflating the values is not necessary in the regressions as this is captured by
the year fixed effects.
8
Figure 1: Kernal Density Distributions of Log(Sales).
measures rather than counting the number of patent application filed each year is that
the benefits of patents are likely to persist into the following years. Following convention,
we depreciate all our patent stock measures by 15% per annum. Treated firms have an
average TotalPatStock of 2.6 patents and control firms just under 1. For 4.0 patenting
firms, one fifth of the patent stock is 4.0 related; a 4.0PatStock of 0.5 on average. For
control firms, 4.0PatStock is by definition zero.
The impact patenting has for both groups can be clearly observed in Figure 2, where
we plot the yearly averages of Log(Sales) for 10 years before and after filing the first
patent. In Figure 2 we exclude firms whose first patent was not a 4.0 patent to make
a comparison between the firms fair.9 Both groups reveal a rather flat trend in average
Log(Sales) before filing their first patent, with 4.0 firms having lower and more volatile
average values. After filing their first patent average sales for both groups substantially
increase. 4.0 patenting firms however seem to benefit more because their average sales
values lie for the subsequent years strictly above the average of the Non-4.0 patenting
9The first patent filed was also a 4.0 patent for about 81% of 4.0 firms.
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firms.
Figure 2: Average Log(Sales) Before and After Patent Filing. Excluding 4.0 Firms whose
first patent was not 4.0.
To make sure that the trend we observe for the 4.0 firms is not driven by the sample
selection that we make, we plot the same graph for all 4.0 firms (including those whose
first patent is not necessarily a 4.0 patent), to be found in the appendix; Figure 4.
5 Econometric Methodology
The choice to engage in 4.0 innovation, and to patent these innovations is left to the
firm, which raises concern of selection bias. Another concern is that firms might differ
systematically from one another in unobservable ways that affect the outcome of interest.
Confounding factors like these, influencing both the dependent and independent variable
cause a spurious and unidentified relationship between the two. An example of a con-
founding factor in our case may be a firms’ absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity is
likely to affect both the likelihood of a firm to engage in 4.0 innovation (and to patent it),
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but also its ability to commercialise it and generate sales from it (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990). When panel data is available, fixed effects are frequently used to limit selection bias.
By using only the within-firm variation, the Fixed Effects Least Squares model reduces
selection bias by eliminating these time-invariant confounding factors. Another channel of
endogeneity may arise because the past performance of a firm (or even anticipated growth)
may enable it to better commit resources to subsequent sales. Dynamic models that in-
clude a lagged dependent regressor on the right hand side at least partially alleviates this
problem and controls for the potentially confounding effects of time-invariant effects. We
perform both, Fixed Effects Least Squares and a Dynamic Fixed Effects Panel Model.
Our econometric approach will be described in this section, along with the advantages
and disadvantages of both methodologies.
5.1 Fixed Effects Least Squares
To analyze whether 4.0 patenting firms achieve higher sales, we first estimate a fixed-effects
model using the following specification:
Log(Sales)it = α+ β1 4.0 PatStockit + β2 Non 4.0 PatStockit
+β3 FirmAgeit + τt + µi + νit
(1)
where our dependent variable is the log-transformed sales recorded for firm i at time t.
β1 is our main coefficient of interest and measures the effect of 4.0 PatStockit on sales.
Due to its cumulative nature of counting patents (depreciated at a yearly rate of 15%), it
allows patents filed in previous periods to effect sales in the current period. In order to see
whether the effect is due to 4.0 patents rather than patents more generally speaking, we
need to somehow account for the Non-4.0 patents filed by the firm. Calculated using the
same perpetual inventory method as for 4.0 patent stock, we include Non 4.0 PatStockit
in the model. This enables us to make a direct comparison between the two to test whether
4.0 patents have a stronger or weaker impact on sales compared to Non-4.0 patents. τt
are time invariant and unit invariant regressors that reflect changing intercepts due to
macroeconomic conditions common to all firms. They enter the regression via 24 time
dummies for each survey year. τ1993 is dropped from the regression and is in essence the
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”baseline” intercept.
µi + νit combined is the error term, where the first component, µi is the firm specific
error term at time t and is the firm fixed effect of the equation. The remainder of the
disturbance, νit is assumed to be stochastic and iid. Patent stock and firm age is assumed
to be independent of νit for all i and t. α (a scalar) and µi are not estimable separately
and together capture the unobserved firm-specific effects. These could be things such as
the firms absorptive capacity and general ability to bargain in licensing agreements or to
commercialise 4.0 inventions.
What the FE Least Squares approach does is to eliminate unobserved firm-specific
heterogeneity by demeaning Equation 1, as follows
Log(Sales)it − Log(Sales)i = τt + β (Xit −Xi) + (νit − νi) (2)
Here the three regressors 4.0 PatStock, Non 4.0 PatStock and FirmAge are summarised
into one X vector for simplicity. This is the model that corresponds to our regression
results in Table 2, which will be interpreted in the next section. This FE Least Squares
model allows for arbitrary dependence and heterogeneity across t within a given firm i.
Since the error terms for firm i may still be correlated to the error terms of the same firm
in any other period, we cluster our standard errors at the firm level.
5.2 Dynamic Panel Model
Since the firms’ current sales may be explained by sales of the previous period (presence
of state dependence) we would want to run a regression that allows sales to be dynamic in
nature. There are two types of state dependence: true state dependence and spurious state
dependence. In the former, one would include the lagged dependent variable for its own
sake. An example of this may be salary, which is determined by the previous salary with
an adjustment. In spurious state dependence, the lagged dependent variable is not just
included for its own sake but also to account for unobservables µi or νi,t−1, which is our
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motivation for its inclusion. One can exploit panel data to better understand this dynamic
relationship between sales. This is typically done by including a lagged dependent variable
as a regressor on the right hand side of the equation, as follows:
Log(Sales)it = γ Log(Sales)i,t−1 + β1 4.0 PatStockit
+β2 Non 4.0 PatStockit + β3 FirmAgeit + τt + εit
(3)
Assuming a one-way error component model, εit = µi + νit, where µi and νit are both iid
and independent of each other. γ is a scalar and the lagged dependent variable encom-
passes the effects of the entire time path of the independent variable(s). When we use
Log(Sales)i,t−1 as a regressor on the right hand side, the interpretation of the coefficients
changes, where the γ now measures the effect of a change in Log(Sales) of the previous
period on the change in Log(Sales) of the current period.
However, there are some limitations to this dynamic approach. Since Log(Sales)it is a
function of µi, it immediately follows that the lagged response variable Log(Sales)i,t−1 is
also a function of µi, and therefore endogenous, rendering the OLS estimator biased and
inconsistent even if the νit are not serially correlated. In the FE Least Squares model,
the µi is eliminated as a result of demeaning all regressors on a firm level (the within
transformation). However, the fixed effects approach still does not lead to consistent
estimates here because Log(Sales)i,t−1 will still be correlated with (νit − νi) because
Log(Sales)i,t−1 is correlated with νi by construction.
10 As discussed in Baltagi (2005),
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure
in which firm specific effects are eliminated by first differencing Equation 3 to get:
Log(Sales)it − Log(Sales)i,t−1 = γ
[
Log(Sales)i,t−1 − Log(Sales)i,t−2
]
+τt + β (Xit −Xi,t−1) + (εit − εi,t−1)
(4)
Then using lagged regressors as instruments leads to consistent estimates of the beta
10The consistency of the within estimator will depend on the T being large (Nickell, 1981). It is also worth
noting that the inclusion of a lagged regressor increases model fitness (higher R2) and tends to result
in error terms with little serial correlation. This is because Log(Sales)i,t−1 contributes the most to R
2.
Furthermore, including a lagged response variable makes most time-invariant regressors useless, but as
we are not interested in these regressors, it does not pose a limitation for us.
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parameters. The three regressors 4.0 PatStock, Non 4.0 PatStock and FirmAge are
again summarised into one X vector for simplicity. An important part of the model
specification is the assumptions we make about the correlation between the the regres-
sors X and the error term ε. We assume that E(PatStockitεis) = 0, ∀s ≥ t and
E(PatStockitεis) 6= 0, ∀s < t, for both 4.0 and Non-4.0 patent stock, which means that X
can be correlated with past error terms but not with contemporary or future error terms.
Assuming a predetermined relationship for patent stock makes sense, as the cumulative
nature of patent stock at any given time t will depend on past patent stock (except in the
t where the first ever (4.0) patent is filed). We implement this estimation as a two-step
GMM regression as this is asymptotically efficient when errors are heteroskedastic.
6 Results
Results to the FE Least Squares model are presented in Table 2. Since our dependent
variable is log-transformed, coefficients on patent stock are to be interpreted as semi-
elasticities. Column (1) corresponds to results on the complete sample of all firm sizes
and indicates that one more 4.0 patent in a given period (which can also result from
several discounted 4.0 patents of previous periods) is associated with a 8.3% increase in
sales. The coefficient on Non − 4.0PatStock is also positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level, yet it is comparatively lower with an estimated increase in sales of 3.0%.
The difference between the two coefficients, β1 and β2 is statistically significant (p-value
of 0.009) and supports our hypothesis that the benefits (increased sales) of commercial-
ising 4.0 patents are greater than for Non-4.0 patents, believed to be due to the greater
industrial applicability of these inventions, allowing firms to target a larger market and
more heterogeneous customers.
Columns (2)-(4) present the regression results according to firm size, in ascending or-
der. Sales of small firms (1-10 employees) increase even more on average than the total
population average, for both 4.0 and Non-4.0 patents. As firms get larger, the effect of
4.0 patent stock decreases; from 10.5% for small firms, to 6.6% for medium sized firms
(11-50 employees), to 5.5% for large firms (51-250 employees). Results become a little
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Least Squares Regression Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sales)
Total
Log(Sales)
Small
Log(Sales)
Medium
Log(Sales)
Large
4.0 PatStock 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗ 0.0551∗∗
(4.30) (2.92) (2.25) (2.33)
Non-4.0 PatStock 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(6.74) (5.32) (3.92) (4.06)
Log(Age) 0.552∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(33.24) (25.05) (13.33) (5.80)
Constant 13.51∗∗∗ 12.57∗∗∗ 14.02∗∗∗ 15.79∗∗∗
(276.56) (160.38) (164.49) (204.91)
Within R2 0.149 0.144 0.227 0.229
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 193199 97460 47298 48441
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: Each column gives the results of a linear fixed effects regression where the
dependent variable is Log(Sales). Column 1 estimates the model for the full sample and
columns 2-4 include the results for the sample of small, medium and large firms
respectively.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
more uncertain for medium and large firms as the significance level drops to 5%, despite
the within R2 increasing to above 22%. The coefficient estimates on Log(Age) tells us
that sales also increase with firm age but deteriorating with firm size.
We also ran a nonlinear version of this regression, in which we include squared patent
stock regressors, as shown in Table 3. Including nonlinear parameters of patent stock
does not increase the within R2 but the coefficients on the Non − 4.0 PatStock roughly
double in magnitude compared to the linear model in Table 2. Across all firm size cate-
gories, Non− 4.0 PatStock reveals a concave relationship with sales, meaning that after
a certain stock size is reached further increases do not contribute to an increase in sales.
This turning point for small firms for instance, is 0.08382×0.00122 = 34.3. Therefore, once a
small firm accumulates a Non− 4.0 PatStock of 34.3 patents, additional Non-4.0 patents
will not further increase sales, on average.11 4.0 PatStock remains positive across all firm
size categories, statistical significance decreases with firm size. Interestingly, the nonlinear
11The maximum Non− 4.0 PatStock for small firms was 55.6 patents.
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relationship in column (4) shows no evidence of 4.0 PatStock reaching a turning point,
rather it is increasing, but insignificant.
Table 3: Nonlinear Fixed Effects Least Squares Regression Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sales)
Total
Log(Sales)
Small
Log(Sales)
Medium
Log(Sales)
Large
4.0 PatStock 0.107∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.0799∗ 0.0464
(4.55) (3.99) (1.83) (1.49)
4.0 PatStock2 -0.00289∗∗∗ -0.00514∗∗∗ -0.00215 0.00121
(-2.70) (-3.37) (-0.38) (0.33)
Non-4.0 PatStock 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0285∗∗∗
(9.26) (6.68) (6.07) (6.50)
Non-4.0 PatStock2 -0.000868∗∗∗ -0.00122∗∗∗ -0.00120∗∗∗ -0.000459∗∗∗
(-5.12) (-3.53) (-5.63) (-2.98)
Log(Age) 0.544∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(32.71) (24.37) (12.96) (5.66)
Constant 13.51∗∗∗ 12.58∗∗∗ 14.03∗∗∗ 15.79∗∗∗
(277.16) (160.52) (165.74) (205.60)
Within R2 0.150 0.145 0.229 0.231
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 193199 97460 47298 48441
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: Each column gives the results of a linear fixed effects regression where the
dependent variable is Log(Sales). This model includes a quadratic term of both 4.0 and
Non-4.0 patent stock. Column 1 estimates the model for the full sample and columns 2-4
include the results for the sample of small, medium and large firms respectively.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We now turn to the results from the Dynamic Panel Model, first the results that corre-
spond to Equation 3 as shown in columns (2)-(5) of Table 4 and afterwards we turn to the
Two-Step GMM regression results. Naturally, the number of observations drops as the
earliest observation of each firm cannot enter the regression as a result of using the lagged
dependent variable as a regressor.12 For this reason, we also report the Fixed Effects Least
Squares estimates in column (1) using the smaller sample to ensure that results still hold,
and indeed they are unmistakably similar to column (1) of Table 2. The magnitudes of
the patent stock variables are lower in the dynamic panel model, but the overall finding
12Observations actually drop by more than the total number of firms (19,212) because of the restriction
that the lagged regressor has to be observed in t−1 and since we have an unbalanced panel, some firms
sales are not observed in t− 1.
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that the effect of patent stock decreases with firm size, and that 4.0 patent stock has a
larger effect than Non-4.0 patent stock holds.
Table 4: Dynamic Panel Model Regression Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Sales)
Total
Log(Sales)
Total
Log(Sales)
Small
Log(Sales)
Medium
Log(Sales)
Large
4.0 PatStock 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0183
(4.24) (3.75) (2.83) (2.64) (1.28)
Non-4.0 PatStock 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.00749∗∗ 0.00449∗∗
(6.23) (5.03) (3.61) (2.38) (2.50)
Log(Age) 0.552∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.0292∗ -0.0334∗∗
(22.93) (1.98) (4.01) (1.66) (-2.16)
L.Log(Sales) 0.638∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗
(104.27) (87.14) (55.58) (44.51)
Constant 13.73∗∗∗ 5.458∗∗∗ 5.261∗∗∗ 4.591∗∗∗ 5.848∗∗∗
(226.53) (61.79) (50.13) (26.26) (25.37)
Within R2 0.124 0.518 0.501 0.616 0.573
Firm FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Clustered SE X X X X X
Observations 138454 138454 63311 36820 38323
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: This table gives the results of the dynamic panel model where the dependent variable
is Log(Sales). Column 1 restates the results from the linear fixed effects model on the
new sample. Column 2 estimates the model for the full sample and columns 3-5 include the
results for the sample of small, medium and large firms respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The Two-Step GMM regression results are presented in Table 5. Finding valid instru-
ments though was quite challenging partly because of the long time series dimension of the
data. But after restricting the number of potential instruments and playing with the as-
sumption on the correlation between the explanatory variables and the idiosyncratic error
term, we find a set of valid instruments for all three firm sizes, albeit only marginally sig-
nificant for small firms as indicated by the p-value of the Hansen test. For small and large
firms, we even get a statistically significant effect; a one unit increase in 4.0 PatStock
is associated with a 4.29% growth for small and 1.98% growth for large firms’ sales in
the short-run, significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively, ceteris paribus. The es-
timated effect of Non − 4.0 PatStock is a sales growth of 3.48% for small, and around
0.8% for medium and large firm. Somewhat surprising is the negative and significant effect
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of Log(Age), but as the coefficient is to be interpreted as an elasticity, the magnitude is
small; a 1% increase in firm age is associated with a 0.0669% reduction in sales (column 1).
Table 5: Two-Step GMM Regression Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sales)
Total
Log(Sales)
Small
Log(Sales)
Medium
Log(Sales)
Large
4IR PatStock 0.0256∗∗ 0.0429∗∗ 0.0111 0.0198∗
(2.53) (2.06) (0.90) (1.84)
Non-4IR PatStock 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.00740∗∗ 0.00855∗∗∗
(5.38) (5.54) (2.46) (3.98)
Log(Age) -0.00669 -0.0249∗∗ -0.0361∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗∗
(-0.56) (-2.00) (-10.21) (-6.34)
L.Log(Sales) 0.893∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗
(39.97) (20.61) (28.28) (28.25)
Constant 1.757∗∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗
(5.63) (5.93) (2.56) (3.44)
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 138454 63311 36820 38323
Nr. of Groups 17796 10214 3782 3800
Nr. of Instruments 201 201 195 200
Hansen P-Value 0.0972 0.0905 0.668 0.388
AR(2) P-Value 0.00103 0.0736 0.00120 0.00227
t statistics in parentheses
Notes: This table gives the results of the dynamic panel model where the dependent
variable is Log(Sales). These models were estimated using a 2-step GMM approach.
Instruments used: 4IR PatStock and Non− 4IR PatStock as predetermined, and
Log(Age) and year dummies as strictly exogenous, all with three lags from t− 1 to t− 3.
Column 1 estimates the model for the full sample and columns 2-4 include the results
for the sample of small, medium and large firms respectively. P-values for the Hansen
test on overidentifying restrictions reports the validity of the instruments.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients on both patent stocks in column (2)
and (4) again confirms all our previous results that the benefit from patent stock de-
creases with firm size, and that 4.0 PatStock provides a greater advantage compared to
Non− 4.0 PatStock. The lagged dependent regressor L.Log(Sales) is informative of the
persistence of sales turnover. The coefficient on the total sample for instance, was esti-
mated to be 0.89, which indicates that even when a firm has zero patent stock, one can
expect the sales in year t to be 89% of the size of sales in the previous period, t− 1.
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7 Conclusion
The 4th Industrial Revolution has the potential to completely revolutionize the function-
ing of our economy. Its impacts are not yet well understood however, as little economic
research on this topic exists due to a lack of consensus as to what should be considered
as 4.0-related and how to measure it. Using a newly developed cartography by the EPO,
this study is one of the first large-scale, systematic analysis on all European 4.0 Patents
filed by German firms.
We focus on developers (or inventors) of 4.0-related technology (rather than adopters)
and investigate the effect that 4.0 patents have on the economic performance of the in-
novating firm. We outline two channels of (sales) growth based on the findings of the
closely related literature on ICT, patents and firm performance. A 4.0 developing firm
can boost sales turnover through (1) selling products encompassing their 4.0 technology,
and/or (2) licensing royalties or sale of the patent itself. As a general purpose technology
(GPT), 4.0 technology has wider industrial applicability, which allows 4.0 firms to boost
sales turnover more so than their Non-4.0 counterparts.
To empirically examine if patenting in 4.0 technology has the awaited positive effect
on the firm’s economic performance we conducted a treatment effects analysis using both
linear fixed effects regressions and a dynamic panel approach. The results of our fixed
effects models of 4.0 patent stock on the development of sales suggest that innovating in
the area of Industry 4.0 affects the firm’s sales positively. This effect is estimated to be
higher than for Non-4.0 technology. However, the importance of holding these patents
diminishes with firm size. Suspecting sales to have a dynamic effect, we additionally esti-
mated models including sales of the previous period. The results of these models differ in
size and significance but not in the qualitative interpretation of the effect.
Hence, the main conclusion of our analysis is that innovating in 4.0 technology effects
the firms’ sales positively and that it does so to a larger extent than innovating in other
19
technology fields.
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Appendix
Figure 3: Firm Observations by Size.
Figure 4: Average Log(Sales) Before and After 4.0 Patent Filing (Only 4.0 Firms)
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Table A.1: Patent-Level Descriptive Statistics.
(1) (2) (3)
Non-4.0 4.0 Mean Differences
mean sd mean sd p
Number of Applicants 1.0963 (0.37) 1.1573 (1.86) 0.061
Number of Inventors 2.0665 (1.44) 2.2271 (2.35) 0.000
Geographical Coverage 4.8355 (3.48) 3.8457 (2.51) 0.000
Claims 7.5862 (7.89) 6.3456 (7.61) 0.000
Patent Scope 1.7570 (1.07) 1.9247 (1.15) 0.000
Observations 86959 3293 90252
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